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RISK MANAGEMENT THEORY: REDUCING 
LIABILITY IN CORPORATE AND MEDICAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Edward P. Richards* 
Abraham Silvers** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a consensus in the business community that the 
traditional methods of resolving legal disputes have become too 
time consuming and expensive.1 This has led businesses to explore 
various alternative strategies for dispute resolution,• and to be­
come increasingly interested in dispute avoidance strategies such 
as risk management. 8 This article presents an analytic framework 
for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of risk management strate­
gies.• The problem of cost-effectiveness is critical to the develop­
ment of risk management programs because many risks may be 
* Of counsel, Roberts & Markel, Houston, Texas. B.A., Rice University; J.D., Univer­
sity of Houston. Member of Texas bar. 
** Associate Professor, Baylor College of Medicine; Associate ProfeSBOr, University of 
Texas School of Publ ic Health. B.S., University of California, Los Angeles; Ph.D., University 
of California, Los Angeles. 
1. The Highest Legal Fees, NawswBBK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 71; Fat Fees, Tum, July 27, 
1981, at 68; R. Banks, Litigation Coat Control: A Xerox Case History, CBNTBR POR Pua. 
RESOURCES NEws LETTBR, VI, Bl (1980) to be reprinted in 1 DrsPUTB MANAGEMENT: A MAN­
UAL OF INNOVATIVE CORPORATl!l .STRATBGIBS FOR THE AVOIDANCE AND RuoLUTION OP DISPUTES, 
VI:Bl (1982). 
2. Bodily, When Should You Go To Court?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1981, at 103; 
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. _, _ (1982). See alao Working 
Smarter, FORTUNE, June 15, 1981, at 68. 
3. Risk management is conaidered a subset of the general area of preventative law, 
although it is almost impossible to define a preventative law strategy that is not also a risk 
management strategy. This area was pioneered by Louis Brown, who has written extensively 
on the problems of preventative law. See L. BROWN, PREVENTATIVE LAW (1950); L. BROWN & 
E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYBRS: MATERIALS ON A NON-ADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCBSS (1978); 
Brown, Preventatiue Law and Public Relations-Improving the Legal Health of America, 
39 A.B.A.J. 556 (1953); BROWN, AN INQUIRY INTO WHETHER PREVENTATIVE LAw SHOULD BE 
RANKED AS A SPECIALITY (ABA Specialization Monograph No. 2). 
4. While this framework is expressed in terms of a statistical model, it is meant to be a 
heuristic device rather than an algorithm that can be used for calculations. Someone wishing 
to use this model for computations would have to collect substantial background data to 
make the model useful in a specific situation. Refer to text accompanying notes 9-10 supra. 
251 
252 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW !Vol . 19:251 
prevented only at a cost greatly in excess of the. cost o
f their occur­
rence.11 A business that tried to prevent these risks would go bank-
rupt, even if its interventions were successful: . 
This article also presents a model for dealmg with the complex 
interactions between risk factors that arise from the presence of 
feedback6 and pipelining.7 Feedback and pipelining are central 
problems in risk management because of the long interval between 
the occurrence of a risk and the eventual resolution of the resulting 
judicial proceedings. This delay may allow many more persons to 
be injured (filling the pipeline) before the business becomes aware 
of the risk. Pipelining can only be avoided by the development of 
more effective monitoring parameters than those currently used in 
the business environment. 8 
The model for dealing with these problems presents a basic set 
of tools to help legal planners and risk management personnel to 
develop strategies to more effectively monitor the performance of 
risk management programs. The preliminary design criteria are re­
viewed for establishing a risk monitoring program in a hospital, 
using examples that are applicable to other businesses. These cri­
teria are necessarily rudimentary because we lack accurate data on 
risk management problems. A major goal of this article is to pre­
sent a common framework for risk management data collection 
and evaluation.9 This will allow the collection of data from many 
5. The problem of cost effectiveness became critical in the medical environment when 
many hospitals had their malpractice insurance premiums raised 50 ':'.� or more. For facilities 
without a history of large losses it was n o  longer cost effective to continue their existing 
insurance arrangements. See B. BROWN, RISK MANAGEMENT FoR HosPITALS 5 (1979); Korsak, 
Risk Management Activities Boost Effectiveness of Self-Insurance P rogram, 52 HosP., Feb. 
16, 1978, at 58; Larson, Malpractice Self Insurance, 31 J. HosP. MGMT., Aug. 1977, at 42; 
Ribin & Staples, Risk Management Is More Than Buying Insurance Policies, 32 J. HosP. 
MGMT., Aug. 1979, at 20. 
. 6. Feedback occurs when the end result of a continuing process influences earlier steps m th� process, eith�r
. 
reducing the probability of the end result (negative feedback), or in­
creasing the probab1hty of the end result (positive feedback). 
7. Pipelining is a. term borrowed from. the oil business. In that context it originally meant the amount. of 01! that had to be put mto an empty pipeline before any oil came out the ?ther end. This represented the amount of oil that would remain in the pipeline after 
the mput was stopped. In general, pipelining represents any process that t' f 
·00 f · f · · . 
con mues or a 
pen o time a ter its mput 1s stopped. 
8. An example of this was the industry-wide rating system f o  J t' · . . . . r ma prac ice insurance premiums that prevented md1v1dual hospitals from benefiting from th · I 1 · . e1r exemp ary c aims records. See Qm_nley, Self·I�urance, 31 J. HosP. MGMT., Nov. 1977, at 20. 
9. The desue to quantify legal analysis is as old as J·urisprud ·ts If b h . ence 1 e , ut t e most succmct statement of the problem was by Judge Cardozo· "Th d th . b · · h " B c T p ey o mgs etter with loga-r1t ms. . ARDOZO, HE ARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 1 (1928) s l v · ee a so anyo, The Le· 
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different sources and the integration of this data into a general 
model of risk management intervention.10 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management efforts must save more money than they 
cost if they are to be acceptable to business. It does not make eco­
nomic sense to spend $100 to prevent a risk whose occurrence will 
cost only ten dollars. 11 While it may be socially desirable to pre­
vent injuries to workers, a corporation would cheat its shareholders 
if it spent more to prevent injuries than it saved through those 
expenditures.12 In most situations it is cost-effective to prevent in­
juries, but this decision must be based on economic data, not on 
appeals to corporate paternalism. The old corporate controls based 
on government regulation have proven unacceptable, but corpora­
tions have begun to realize that the �tive of regulation 
through Jitigation can be much more cos#. than government regu­
lation.18 Thia new litigation · te de'8Dda that corporations 
quickly develop mechanisma to manage dab, lelt they face cata­
strophic losses from unanticipated litiga.n. 
There are three contributiona to the • of rilk takina behav­
ior. The first is the direct cost due to the OCCJUftllce of the risk. 
This includes the 1088 of skilled personnel, machine downtime, and 
other factors that reduce productivity, as well as the payment of 
compensation to the injured party. The second is the cost of the 
efforts to prevent or manage the risk before its occurrence. The 
gal System Can it Be Analyzed to Suit the Scientist?, in ScmHTlSTS IN THK l..sGAL YSTKM 
(W. Thomas ed. 1974). 
10. For a discussion of the importance of model building, see R. PouND, SOCIAL CON· 
TROL THROUGH LAW (1942). As Profe880r Pound stated: "Theories of what i1 have a marked 
effect upon i deas of what ought to be. Men tend to do what they think they are doing." Id. 
at 26. Another commentator has noted that "[t]he function of a general theory of law i1 not 
to discover the immediate sources of law, however important that may be in the atudy of a 
particular area, but to segregate the factors which operate in all areas in the creation, modi· 
fication, transformation and disappearance of legal a)'ltema." H. C ADlNS, Tm Tu.BORY or 
LEGAL SClENCE 89 (1969). 
11. For an analysis of the economic basis of tort law and ita impact on risk taking, aee 
tevens, M edical Malpractice: Some /mplicatiom of Contract and Arbitration in HM0'1, 
59 Mil.BANK MEMORI AL FuND Q./HBALTH AND Socirrv, 59, 66 (1981). See allo C. TONK, 
WH.ERB Tm LAw ENDS, Tus Socw. CoNTROL or CoRPORATS BKH Avtoa 33 (1975). 
12. This is certainly true if the expenditures cauaed the corporation to 10 out of buai­
n 
· For a discussion of the merita of this view in leaa draatic circU1D.1tancee, aee C. STONE, 
supra note 11, at 75. 
13. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prada. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). 
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third is the cost of the new risks that arise from the efforts to con­
trol the existing risks.14 The complications that arise from medical 
laboratory tests that are ordered because of a fear of malpractice 
suits are a good example of these newly created risks. It would be 
very difficult to defend a patient injury from a medically unneces­
sary test. The cost of these new risks can be important during the 
initial phase of a new risk management program when their cost is 
added to the cost of the claims incurred before the start of the new 
program whose effects are still being felt. After these initial costs 
are absorbed, the costs of the risk management activities will be 
offset by the decreased losses due to the reduced incidence of ex­
isting risks. There will come a point of diminishing returns how­
ever, where the costs of the risk management program will no 
longer be offset by the savings from the reduced incidence of ex­
isting risks. · · · · al 
To put the problem of diminishing returns into a mathemati.
c . 
shorthand let C represent the total cost of risk management actl
�­
ties; let C� repr:sent the costs due to the occurrence of risk; let n 
represent the direct cost of risk management efforts; let Cm rep�
esen� 
the indirect cost of risk management activities due to the �reatl�:n 
new risks· and let L represent the total losses related to risks. ' 
1 d t the occur-the total losses will equal the sum of the costs re ate 0 . k . 
__
_ rence 
_
_ o(_!lsks �n<:i.the_t9!_al �9�� of the efforts to _prevent the ns s. 
L ""'C0 +CR 
The total cost of the efforts to prevent the risks will equal the 
money directly spent on risk management efforts, plus the costs 
due to the new risks that are created: 
CR =CD+ CID 
�hen there are no expenditures for risk management efforts, t�ere 
will also not be any indirect losses due to the creation of new rISks· At this point the cost of the occurrence of risks will be the total losses of the program. If it is assumed that risk management ef­forts will 
�ave some effect on reducing the costs due to the �ur· rence of risks, then the costs of the occurrence of existing ri�ks should he at their maximum value when the expenditures for rISk management activities are zero. 
When the business begins to spend money on risk manage· 
14. For a discussion of the cost.a aaaociated with the use of extra x-rays, see Manalifll Severe Head Injury, Doing More and Fari111 Worse?, 1980 LANCBT 1229. 
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ment activities, the costs due to the occurrence of risks will de­
crease. This reduction will continue until all the preventable risks 
are eliminated, leaving only an irreducible baseline cost due to the 
occurrence of unpreventable risks. Because it is impossible to pre­
vent all risks, 111 the costs due to the occurrence of risks can only be 
reduced to this baseline level. At the same time that the increased 
expenditures for risk management efforts are reducing the costs 
due to the occurrence of risks, the costs due to the occurrence of 
new risks created by the risk management efforts will be increas­
ing. Since the total cost of the risk management program includes 
both the direct expenditures for risk management activities and 
the indirect costs arising from the creation of new risks, then the 
total cost of the risk management program· will always be greater 
than the b udgeted expenditures. 
These relationships imply that the costs resulting from the oc­
currence of risks are inversely related1• to the total cost of the risk 
management efforts. This inverse relationship holds to the point 
where the costs due to the occurrence of risks have been reduced 
to their minimum level. Once this minimum level has been 
reached, further expenditures for risk management activities will 
not reduce the costs due to the occurrence of risks. H the total 
costs of risk management activities (Ca) are plotted against the 
costs due to the occurence of risks (C0), with (K) representing the 
m
.inimum cost of existing risks, then a graph of the following type will be obtained: 
K 
. 
15. Judge Bazelon once stated that "[t]be question is then not whether w� �11 have risk at all, but how much risk and from what source." Bazelon, Risk and Re1ponaibility, 205 ScrENcE 277 (1979). . . 
i 16· An inverse relationship means that one quantity decreases •':'8n ano�er �uan
tity 
ncreases. This may be a direct relationahip such • when a one-dollar m� in .nak man· &gernent expenditures results in a one.:dollar drop in the coats due to neb, or it may be lllore complex involving the quantification of nonmonetary benefits. 
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It is only the basic type of the curve that is important.17 It is im­
possible to establish a value for any of the points along the curve 
without actual data on the costs and benefits of the particular risk 
management system under study. 
Since the total losses related to risks are equal to the sum of 
the costs due to the occurrence of risks (both new and old) and the 
cost of the risk management activities, the curve illustrates that 
there will be a point where it is not cost effective to spend more 
money on risk management activities. Once this point is reached, 
the added expenditures will not result in a corresponding decrease 
in the losses due to the occurrence of risks. This is the optimal 
operating point for a risk management program, and can only be 
recognized by careful analysis of the decrease in the costs due to 
the occurrence of risks for each increase in direct risk management 
expenditures. By using this operating point as a reference, it is 
possible to set up five risk classes, based on the economic conse­
quences of the occurrence of specific individual risks: 
1. Prevented risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence is higher 
than their cost of management, and whose occurrence may 
invoke additional legal sanctions. This class would include 
intentional torts and injuries caused by gross negligence.18 
2. Normally prevented risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence 
is greater than the cost of their management, but whose 
occurrence will only be considered negligent. This class in­
cludes most negligent injuries and most type of products 
liability actions. 19 
17. The important characteristics of this curve are that it intercepts the Y axis {where 
the c�sts due to the occurrence of risks have a highest value) and it reaches a limit (the 
baseline cost of unpreventable risks) despite further increases in the expenditwes for risk 
management activities. 
18. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. A pp. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 
(1967), where the court noted the following: 
From all ?f the evidence �he jury could find that appellant acted recklessly and in 
w�ton
. 
�isregard of possible harm to others in marketing, promoting, selling and 
mamtammg MER/29
. 
on the market in view of its knowledge of the toxic effects of 
the ?rug. Sue? a findmg would necessarily be a finding of malice in fact, and since �he Jury was instructed only on malice as a foundation for an award of punitive 
th
am8!es an
d 
d �ade
_ 
such an award in respondent's favor, we must presume that ey •Oun malice m fact. 
Id. at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. 
19. For example, it is generally re · ed th • · before closing the . . . . l' 
cogniz at a swgeon s failure to remove a sponge 
142 S.W.2d 238 
�:�ist;n 18 ��g igAence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Thompson v. Barnard, 
• 
ex. iv. pp.-Waco 1940), aff'd 138 Tex. 277, 158 S.W.2d 486 
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3. Managed risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence is only 
slightly greater than their cost of management. The plain­
tiff usually has the burden of showing that the defendant 
owed him or her a special duty to recover for one of these 
risks.20 
4. Unprevented risks. Risks whose cost of occurrence is less 
than their cost of management. The classic example of this 
class ·is the cost of railroad crossing barriers compared to 
the damages sustained by people who are hit by trains.11 
5. Unpreventable Risks. Risks whose occurrence is un­
manageable. 22 
The assignment of a risk to one of these classes is a major 
problem in risk management because the class of a risk determines 
how much effort must be expended to prevent the risk. The mis­
classification of a prevented or normally prevented risk as a man­
aged or unprevented risk can result in large financial losses. For 
ex
�mple, a hospital that does not update obsolete procedures such 
as •�accurate monitoring of oxygen in the premature nursery would 
he hable for any injuries attributable to this failure to update pro­
cedures. 23 These classifications must be reviewed periodically to 
de
�ermine if the cost of the risk taking behavior has changed, al­
tering the classification of the risks. 
III. CALCULATING THE COST OF RISK TAKING BEHAVIOR 
There are two parties to risk taking, the party with the re­sponsibility for managing or preventing the risk (the riskor), and the party who is injured by the occurrence of the risk (the riskee). 
0942). 
20· See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW or TORTS 244-45 (4th ed. 197l). . 
d . 21. There are thousands of railroad/highway intersections that do not have warm�g 
a ::
1
;
es. to sign al the approach of an oncoming train. These unguarded intersectio� result m · · tam number of accidents each year forcing the railroad to pay out compensation to the lhJUred Parties in many cases. yet the total cost of these payments is much lower than the 
��st of providing the signaling devices that would prevent these accidents. See W. PROSSER, pra note 20, at 148. . . 
na ·1
22. These risks include acts of God, acts of war, and force majeure. 1:he riskor I� ord1-
to 
r1 Y not liable for damages for the occurrence of these risks unless the r1skor contributed d 
�
he damage caused by the risk through negligence, such as not using proper earthquake es1gn criteria. See, e.g., J. MURRAY, CoNTRAcrs 390-91 (1974). . 
rerd 
2
3· Air Shields, Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 581 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, wnt n.r.e.). 
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When a risk occurs, the riskor suffers certain direct costs. The ris­
kor will spend a certain amount to determine whether, and how 
much, the riskee should be paid in compensation for the injury, 
and will then pay the riskee the determined amount. The total cost 
to the riskor will be the sum of the cost of the reduced productiv­
ity, the cost of evaluating the claim for compensation, and the ac­
tual compensation payment. These costs are independent of the 
amount that the riskor may have spent on risk management ef­
forts, except to the extent that the risk management efforts miti­
gated the damage caused by the occurrence of the risk. This inde­
pendence derives from the legal practice of determining the 
damages due an injured person without reference to the status of 
the party responsible for the injury.•' This means that while risk 
management efforts may show good faith on the part of the riskor, 
they will only reduce the cost of a risk by the actual amount that 
the damages are mitigated; there is no allowance for unsuccessful 
efforts. These costs become interrelated in the situations where the 
courts consider the behavior or status of the riskor: 
(1) When there is a statutory penalty involved. The criminal 
penalties for mis prescribing narcotics are an important example;•• 
(2) When the injury resulted from an intentional or grossly 
negligent act. When this occurs, the court allows the award of pu· 
nitive damages; .. 
(3) When the law limits the compensation that may be paid 
in order to protect the riskor from financial loss. This is the effect 
of the workers' compensation laws, and the specific purpose of 
many statutes limiting the recovery of damages in medical mal· 
practice suits;97 and 
(4) When a comparative negligence standard is used. While 
comparative negligence is seldom used in the trial of a medical 
malpractice suit, negligence on the part of the patient (not re· 
turning for follow-up care, for example) can weaken the proof of 
causation and drastically lower the settlement value of the case.11 
In each of these situations there has been a public policy deci-
(s 
24· BALDWIN, Damages in Personal Injury and Death Cases in DAMAGES E-1 to 19 tate Bar of Texas 1977). ' 
2
2
6
5· 
Re
D8!1gerous Drugs Act, TEX. RBv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-14 (Vernon 1976). 
· ier to note 18 supra. 
27. Medical Liability and Insurance Im rovem A 4590i (Vernon Supp. 1982). 
P ent ct, 'I'Ex. RBv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 
28. See generally W. PRossER, supra note 20, at 416. 
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sion that the cost to society should be considered when damages 
are assessed against the riskor. This is because the relationship be­
tween the cost of the occurrence of a risk and the cost of managing 
the risk determines how vigorously the corporation will attempt to 
manage the risk. 29 Society can only effectuate its policies by alter­
i ng the relationship between the cost of the occurrence of a risk 
and the cost of managing the risk. ao The riskor will best balance its 
needs against those of the individual workers, and of society as a 
whole, when the worker receives enough to be made whole, and the 
cost of the occurrence of the risk is greater than the cost of 
preventing the risk. In general, there are four types of situations: 
when the compensation payment does not make the original riskee 
whole, then the riskee may be unwilling to be exposed to the risk; 
when the compensation payment is more than the amount needed 
to make the riskee whole, then the riskee may contribute to the 
occurrence of the risk; when the cost of the occurrence is less than 
the cost of managing the risk, then the original riskor will not have 
an incentive to prevent the risk;81 and when the cost of the occur­
rence is much higher than the cost of managing the risk, the riskor 
may totally prevent the risk by not engaging in the business that 
causes the risk, at the expense of the benefits to society that are 
normally gained from this business.11 
When the cost of managing a risk greatly exceeds the cost of 
the occurrence of the risk, the riskor may allow the occurrence of 
risks whose cost to society is unacceptably high. u Since existing 
29. For a mathematical analysis of the optimal level of malpractice litigation, see 
Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages, and Deterrence, 298 N•w ENG. J. MED. 1282 
(l978) (concluding that there are too few suits to provide an incentive to improve medical 
care). 
30. But see C. STONE, supra note 11, at 91. 31. For example, in the criminal proceeding against Richardson-Menell for lying to 
the Food and Drug Ad minist ration about the hazards of MER/29, the company pleaded no 
contest, and was fined only $80,000. Id. at 56. . . 32. While many insurance companies have maintained that the coet of �roducts Iiabil-1ty msurance has driven many products off the market, it is difficult to pinpoint an example of a beneficial product that is unavailable because of insurance coeta. 
33. In this regard, Stone offers the following eumple: 
In April 1960 the FDA granted Richardson-Merrell's application to market 
MER/29. The drug was not on the market long before evidence of alarming symp­
toms began to come to Richardson-Menel l's attention. It (the evidence) was al­
most all intercepted at various levels of the corporation and not turned over to the 
FDA. Denials and whitewashing of the drug continued until, in May 1962, its dan­
gers had become 80 generally evidenced that the FDA ordered it withdrawn. In 
that two year marketing period, however, 400,000 people had taken it. In the first 
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legal remedies provide an insufficient incentive for the riskor in 
these situations, society must impose further sanctions if it is to 
shift the cost/benefit ratio toward prevention. The federal laws re­
quiring automobile manufacturers to install seat belts, with sub­
stantial economic penalties for noncompliance, is an example of 
this type of sanction. 
In the situations where the compensation payment is not suffi­
cient to make the riskee whole, the remaining cost of the injury 
must be borne by society. Society may bear this cost directly, 
through charitable medical care and disability payments, for exam­
ple, or it may bear it indirectly through loss of the individual's pro­
ductivity or resources. This cost to society is an indirect subsidy to 
the riskor.84 Ideally, the indirect subsidy will be less than the bene­
fit to society of allowing the riskor to avoid paying the full costs of 
the injuries for which it is responsible. For example, the actual ef -
feet of the workers' compensation laws is to shelter employers from 
the full cost of employee injuries. 80 It is important for policymak­
ers to understand that this sheltering causes the cost of these inju­
ries to be spread among society as a whole,36 an unacceptable re­
sult if the subsidy does not result in general benefits that offset the 
cost to society of the subsidy .17 
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF RISK TAKING 
There are a minimum of three events involved in the loss of 
money due to the occurrence of a risk. The first is an injury caused 
by the occurrence of a risk, the second is a claim for compensation, 
and the third is the payment of the claim for compensation. In the 
simplest case, all injuries will be linked to a claim for compensa­
tion, and all claims will result in a full payout of the amount of the 
claim. 
These three basic transactions do not occur at this simple level 
year alone it added $7,000,000 to Richardson-Merrell's gross sales. 
C. STONE, supra note 11, at 55. 
34. See generally id. at 37. 
35. See Provost & Richards, The Company Doctor's Responsibility to the Employee TRIAL, July 1981, at 35. , 
36. S�e, e.g., Miller, Occupational Safety, TRIAL, July 1981 at 47 ("(l]f employee is spared having to install certain · ' · 
h 
· · · equipment, that employer will save 'costs.' Many of t ese costs, however, . . . are . . . passed on to others ") 37 A 
.... . 
•
• 
8 n�ted by Miller, "(WJe have learned recently that 80 percent of the costs of occupational d19eases are currently borne b y  the public through Social Security disability payments, welfare, veterans' benefits, Medicare and Med" "d ,, Id ICal • • • • • 
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in the real world. Not all riskees will be injured. Some injuries will 
not result in a claim for compensation, and few claims will result in 
a 1003 payout of the requested amount. Because of this uncer­
tainty, it is more appropriate to speak of the probability38 that the 
risk will occur, the probability that the riskee will claim compensa­
tion, and the probability that this compensation will be awarded. 
Each of these events has a certain probability of happening; the 
probability of each event is dependent upon the others.89 It is this 
mutual dependence that prevents the use of the simple conditional 
Bayesian Theorem that has previously dominated attempts to ap­
ply probabilty theory to legal analysis. 
Most of the previous attempts to apply quantitative methods 
to legal problems have used Bayes' Theorem.'0 The underlying as­
sumption of Bayes' Theorem is that the probability of an event 
occurring can be determined by combining the probabilities of the 
events precedent, and that the probabilities of these events are 
independent.41 Some of these analyses were performed on criminal 
law problems in hope of reducing the uncertainty of the criminal 
law process, but this goal was not reached for two fundamental 
reasons. First, in most legal situations, the probabilities of prior 
events are not independent; and second, the criminal law process is 
based on a presumption of innocence. '1 This presumption demands 
that the probability of the accused being guilty must be set close to 
zero.0 As any term approaches zero, Bayes' Theorem is no longer 
38. For example, the probability of drawing an ace from a deck of cards is 1 in 13. See 
generally J. FLEISS, STATISTICAL METHODS roa RATES AND PROPORTIONS 1 (1981). 39. Id. at 2. 
. 40. The main proponent of the Bayesian Theorem has been Michael Finklestein. Mr. Fmkleste in is a practicing attorney whose work has been very innovative, if controversial. See M. F INKLESTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS JN LAW: STUDIES IN THB APPLICATION or MATH­EMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978), reviewed by Kaye, Naked �tatistical Evidence, 89 y ALE L.J. 601 (1980); Fairley, Probablistic Analyais of Identifica­tion Evidence, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1973); Finklestein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics", 84 HARV. L. REv. 1801 (1971); Finklestein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. RBv. 489 (1970); Kaye, Probability T_�ory Meets Res lpsa Loquitur, 77 Mrcu. L. REV. 1456 (1979); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 u. CHI. L. Rev. 34 (1979); Kaye, The Paradoz of the Gatecrasher �nd Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101 (1979); Tribe, A Further Critiq� _
of Mather:iatic'!'l 
:zoo/, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (1971); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in e 
�egal Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971). 1. See J. FLEISS, supra note 38, at 4-11. 42. See, e.g. TBx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.03 (Vernon 1979). 43. "The most problematic feature of Bayes' Theorem in the criminal trial context (or 
�Y trial) is quantifying the initial probability of guilt (or liability in civil proceed­tngs)-P(X). If a presumption of innocence makes that variable equal zero, the formula is 
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an effective model. In order to circumvent this limitation, it is 
necessary to assume that it is relatively likely that the accused did 
commit the crime, an assumption that is philosophically 
unacceptable. 
In order to develop an effective description of risk taking be­
havior, it is useful to use a tree diagram of the events involved. Let 
E0 denote the status quo, let E1 denote the occurrence of a risk, let 
E2 denote the occurrence of a claim for compensation, let E:i denote 
the occurrence of a payout, and in general let En represent the end 
of the chain. Further, let P(E1), P(E2), P(E;i), and P(En) denote the 
probability of the corresponding events, E1, E2, E:1, and En, respec­
tively. Then: 
P(E,) P(E1) P(E3) 
Eo E, Es Ea E" 
� 
) 
� 
>.) 
� 
..; 
� 
) 
Not (E1) Not (E1) Not (E.) Not (E,) 
In this diagram the probability of a risk occurring is P(E1), and the 
probability of the risk not occurring is 1 - P(EJ" The general 
probability of an event E occurring is P(E ), while the general 
probability of an event no{ occurring is 1 - P(En). The odds•11• o_
f an 
event occurring are the probability of the event occurring divided 
by the probability of the event not occurring: 
P(Eu) 
1 - P(Eu) 
The odds of an event occurring are a more useful monitor for 
that event than is it.a probability of occurring because odds are 
more easily understood by administrative or legal personnel. •8 Th
e 
�imply un.wo�kable." Comment, Probability Theory and Constructive Possession of 
Narcot· 
ics: On Finding that Winning Combination, 17 Hous. L. REV. 541, 558-59 (1979). the 44. In .this simple model, the probability that the risk will not occur is (l -
probability that the risk will occur) when the probabilities are expressed as percentages. 
45. See J. Fuuss supra note 38 at 44 
46 "W ds h Ia • ' · e of fine · or are t e wyer s stock in tirade [sic?}. He w ould rather face a pag . tiue print than a simple algebraic formula." Lozowick Steiner & Miller Law and Quantita H 
Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 Micu: L. REv'. 1641, lMl (1968). See als:ke; 
KYBuRG, TuE Loo1cAL FOUNDATIONS or STATISTICAL INrERENCE 96 (1974) ("[A] boOkrn HY 
had better be jolly sure that the odds he posts satisfy the axioms of the probabi 
1 
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odds of a risk occurring, a claim being filed, and compensation be­
ing paid are interdependent. This is significant because it is this 
interdependence that leads to feedback and pipelining. 
V. FEEDBACK AND PIPELINING 
Feedback is an electrical engineering term•' that has crept into 
general usage. As used in this article, it represents the principle 
that the output of  a process affects earlier steps in the process. 
Feedback is positive when it stimulates the process, and it is nega­
tive when it inhibits the process. In the context of this discussion 
of risk management theory, feedback refers to the effect that 
changes in the odds of events occurring have on the odds of other, 
related events occurring. Products liability law provides a good ex­
ample of feedback. 
In the early development of products liability law it was very 
difficult for an injured person to recover compensation from a 
product manufacturer. The defense of privity4• cut off most ac­
tions, and the remainder were defeated by the difficulty of showing 
negligence in manufacture.•• This resulted in negative feedback be­
cause the payouts for lawsuits were very low. This discouraged at­
torneys from filing products liability claims, lowering the odds that 
an injury would be linked to a lawsuit. The low odds of a payout in 
turn reduced the riskor's incentive to make safer products. 
When the courts abolished the privity defense60 and adopted 
various types of strict liability standards, it became easier for a 
!>laintiff to win a reasonable payout. 61 These reasonable payouts 
Increased the chance that an injured person would file a claim for 
compensation (increasing linkage), and provided an incentive for 
calculus."). 
47. For a direct analogy between electrical engineering and law, see H. ODUM, ENVI­
RONMENT, POWER, AND SOCIETY 226 (1971) ( "As systems become old and complex, special 
energies may go into conserving network features through the institution of law. Law may 
be defined as a formal statement of a switching network and its formal alternatives.") . 
. 48. "The law of products liability began with the case of Winterbottom v. Wright .. · �hich has been described as 8 fishbone in the throat of the law .... [Winterbottom estab­
lished early) the general rule that the original seller of goods waa not liable for damages 
caused by their defects to anyone except his immediate buyer or one in privity with him." W. PROSSER, supra note 20, at 641. 
49. Id. at 642 .  
50. J .  SALES & J.  PERDUE, Tim LAW o r  STRICT TORT Lwm.JTY I N  TBxAs 126 (1977). 
51 . Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 , 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
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riskors t o  produce safer products. This positive feedback dramati­
cally changed products liability law from an unimportant area of 
practice to a m ajor area of litigation. 
Feedback usually results in the gradual evolution of the law, 
but it can cause dramatic shifts, rapidly changing the way law is 
practiced. These rapid shifts usually follow legislative actions, such 
as the enactment of the equal employment legislation,62 or major 
judicial reinterpretations of existing laws, such as the Roe v. Wade 
abortion decision. 68 In the usual course of events there is � five- to 
ten-year inertial period between the development of a new legal 
theory and its adoption by the majority of the legal profession. It is 
this inertia that provides the greatest risk management chal­
lenge-the problem of the delayed recognition of i mportant new 
risks due to the lack of litigation pressure. 
The delayed acceptance of new legal theories results in a pe­
riod when the riskor is potentially liable for the consequences of 
the risks affec ted by the new theory, but the probability of being 
sued (linkage) is very low. The riskor will use one of t hree stategies 
in this situation: implement an effective risk management pro­
gram, accepting that it will not be cost effective during the transi­
tion period; c ontinue the status quo, saving money initially but los­
ing money in the longer term; or implement a limited (sham) risk 
management program that will appear effective because of the low 
probability of being sued. 
The implementation of sham risk management programs is 
the usual response to a new legal development. The most common 
example of a sham program is the establishment of an incident re­
porting system without establishing a method of preventing the 
identified risks. a. This can be the most financially risky choice if it 
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . 
. 54: T�is problem usually arises when an incompetent or impaired medical staff mem· �r � �dentlfied. The politics of medical staffing decisions normally make it very difficult to 
discipline a member of the medical staff. For the legal consequences of this problem see Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 7 16 (Tex. 1971); R. BROOK, QUALITY OF CARE ASSESSMENT: A COMPARISON or F1VE METHODS or PEER REVIEW (1973)" Annas Who to Call 
E
When th
P
e
h
Do
.
c�or is Sick, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1979 at 18· C�roll Di�ciplining the rrant ysician· In �· · · I · · ' ' ' 
( 
· . 
irginia, nvestigations Show an Increase 106 V >.. MED. J. 400 1979); Dunn, Hospital Corporat L "  b"l "t · 'F''h Tr · ' 0 e ia ' ' y. 1. ' e end Continues 8 MEDICOLEGAL NEWS ct. 1980, at 16· Felch & Halpern C 
· 
· h Ph · · 
' ' 
MED 1921 
' . . . . • .  oping wit ysician Incompetence, 79 N.Y. ST. J. 
( · . . 
(l979), Fre1hc�, Verification of Physician Credentials, 80 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 1997 
s
�!':�· :•r��· r:,e
C
Medical-Legal Implications of the Problem of the Errant or Sick Phy· ' E OMMENT, July-Aug. 1977, at 23; The Man Who Never Comes Back 2 . 
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delays the implementation of an effective risk management pro­
gram while it documents risks that are not properly managed. It is 
this type of delayed action that leads to pipelining. 
Pipelining is the accumulation of unrecognized liability. This 
occurs when a riskor maintains the status quo approach (or a sham 
program) to managing a specific risk, while the probability of a 
payout due to that risk has been substantially increased. Changes 
in payout can be overlooked for a certain period of time because of 
the long interval between the occurrence of an injury and the pay­
ment of a claim for compensation. In medical malpractice litiga­
tion, for example, this delay can be five years or more. During this 
period, a large number of persons can be injured before the riskor 
becomes aware of the accumulating liability. A dramatic example 
of pipelining occurred at the University of California at Davis 
Medical School. Over a twenty-two-month period, the cardiac sur­
gery and kidney transplant services experienced a dramatic rise in 
morbidity and mortality. This became public when university phy­
sicians stopped ref erring patients to the affected services. Once the 
injured patients became aware of the problem, they filed 
$500,000,000 in lawsuits." 
Most cases of pipelining result from the short-term manage­
ment goals of many managers. These short-term goals can also 
cause an effective program to be abandoned. Just as inertia can 
cause an ineffective risk management program to be continued 
while a pipeline of injured persons accumulates, an effective risk 
management program can be discontinued because of the losses 
that are paid during the start-up phase of the program, but whose 
cause was several years earlier. The only effective protection 
against both pipelining and the abandonment of an effective pro­
gram is the development of short-term monitors of risk manage­
ment performance, coupled with a constant surveillance of feed­
back effects. 
�ANCET 1358 ( 1979); Talbott & Benson, Impaired Phy1ician1: The Dilemma of Identifica­tion, 66 POSTGRADUATE Mso., Dec. 1980, at 56; and Williamson, Braswell, Hom & Loh· meyer, Priority Setting in Quality Auurance: Reliability of Stoff Judgment in Medical 
Institutions, 16 MBo. CARE 931 (1978). 
55. TIME, July 20, 1981, at 72. 
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VI. MONITORING RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
A. Conditional Odds 
It is basic to the development of an effective risk management 
program that the factors that influence the odds of the occurrence 
of each event be identified. For example, the odds of a lawsuit's 
being filed after an injury (the "linkage" between the injury and 
the filing of the lawsuit) are equal to the probability of the suit's 
being filed divided by the probability of the suit's not being filed: 
P(LINKAGE) 
1 - P(LINKAGE) 
There are many factors that can influence the odds of a 
worker's filing a lawsuit. For example, one major factor is whether 
the worker is a member of a strong union ... In this situation we 
would discuss the odds of a worker's filing a lawsuit, contingent 
upon whether that worker is a union member. Those are the condi­
tional odds: we are interested in how the condition of being 8 
union member affects the odds of a worker's filing a lawsuit. This 
would be expressed as the probability of a union member's filing a 
lawsuit, divided by the probability of a union member's not filing 8 
lawsuit: 
P(LINKAGE I UNION MEMBERSHIP) 
1 - P(LINKAGE I UNION MEMBERSHIP) 
The probability of a lawsuit's being filed can be conditioned 
by as many factors as can be identified. 17 The general form for ex­
preBSing the conditional probability that an injury will be linked to 
a lawsuit is: 
P(LINKAGE I C1, C1, C, . . .Cn) 
In this expression C1 could represent union membership, C2 could 
represent the worker's age, C could represent the worker's job 
classification, with additional C terms being added for each factor 
that is identified. The general form for the conditional odds of a 
worker's filing a lawsuit would then be: 
56 U · be This · mon mem rs are protected from arbitrary firings by the grievance process· . 
makes them more likely to take legal action against their employer than nonuni
on 
employees. . 
57. Contrast these conditional factors with Hohfeld's "operative facts." See, e.g., w
. 
HoHPELD, FuNDAMBNTIAL LEGAL CoNcRPTS AS APPLIED IN JuoiciAL REASONING (1978). 
1982] RISK MANAGEMENT 267 
P(LINKAGE I Cu C,, C,, . . .  C0) 
1 - P(LINKAGE I C., C,, C,, . . .  C0) 
This same type of conditional statement could be set up for 
the odds of the occurrence of the risk itself," the odds of a pay­
out,19 or the odds of any other event'° that could be added to the 
chain.61 Using the example of products liability litigation, we 
would determine that the odds of an attorney's filing a products 
liability claim (the linkage of an injury to a lawsuit) is conditioned 
by privity (before this was abolished) , by the standard used for 
liability, and by the potential payout. Thus: 
P(LINKAGE/PRIVITY, LIABILITY, PAYOUT) 
1 - P(LINKAGE/PRIVITY, LIABILITY, PAYOUT) 
It is the identification and tracking of these conditional factors 
that form the basis of effective risk management programs. 
Changes in these conditional factors will presage changes in the 
odds of the major events' being monitored, giving the riskor ad­
vance warning of incipient problems. The tracking of these factors 
involves standard data processing techniques such as trend analy­
sis, 12 but the factors themselves will differ in each different risk 
environment. For example, in a hospit.al the risk manager will 
monitor such factors as patient satisfaction, compliance with ther­
a�y, and medication errors, while in a steel mill the risk manager 
will monitor visits to the medical department, requests for safety 
equipment, and sick leave. The same mathematical techniques 
c�uld be used, although the data themselves would be. complete�y 
dif erent. The main caveat in designing these tracking programs is 
that the mathematical techniques used do not mask the occurrence 
of unusual events that can disproportionately influence liability. 
B. Outliers 
Outlier is the mathematical term for an unusual event that can have a disproportionate effect on the process being monitored 
because the event lies outside of the expected range . for the data. 
An outlier may be a catastrophic event, such as incinerating a pa-
58. P(RISK I Cl' C2, c3, • • • Cn). S9. P(PAYOUT I Cl' c2, C3, • • • Cn). 60. P<EVENT / c1, c2, c3, • • • en). 61. For a philosophical discussion of the interdependence of legal events, see G. }{gGIU., NATURAL LAW 60 (1975). 62. C. OSTROM, TIME SBRIBS .ANALYSIS: RliGRBSSION 'l'BcHNJQUBS 9 (1978). 
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tient,63 or it may be an unusual trend, such as an excess of respira­
tory deaths during a certain time period.64 Outliers are important 
because they usually represent the type of prevented or normally 
prevented risk that can lead to large financial losses. Since most 
commonly used statistical techniques mask outliers by averaging 
them into the bulk of the data, the data must be scanned, either 
manually or electronically, to identify any outliers. This process of 
identification is called flagging, from the data processing technique 
of marking certain types of data with codes called flags. It is im­
portant to realize that a point may be an outlier because it is out 
of the range normally observed by the specific riskor, or it can be 
an outlier because it is outside the range of values observed by 
similar riskors. In the second case it can violate the standard of 
care required, even though it is within the range usually observed 
by the individual riskor. It is the identification of these "commu­
nity standard" outliers that demands an effective means of sharing 
risk management data among riskors. The analysis of conditional 
factors and outliers is important in demonstrating the effectiveness 
of new risk management strategies in situations where there is a 
substantial residual liability obscuring the effectiveness of the new 
program. If the manager can demonstrate favorable trends in the 
conditional factors and reduce the number of outliers, he will be 
able to legitimate the new program despite the "pipeline" of past 
claims that must be paid. Such analysis is critical to insure that an 
effective strategy will not be discarded because of the inertia of the 
system being managed. The remainder of this paper will illustrate 
the use of this method by analyzing the problem of acceptance of 
risk in the medical environment, using the same methods 
.
that 
would be used to analyze risk taking behavior in other situations. 
VII. MANAGING MEDICAL LEGAL RISKS 
. The management of the legal risks that arise in th
e me�i� 
environment involves activities that reduce the odds of the risks 
occurring, and activities that reduce the odds of the injured p
a-
63. Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp. 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dis
t.] 
1981, writ filed). 
64. A murderer in the Ann Arbor, Michigan Veterans Administration Hospital was 
able to kill eight patients with a respiratory depr�nt and poison 40 others before the 
h ·ta1 be f h ' . 1 30-daY osp1 came aware o t e problem, even though the events took place m on Y a 
period. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 19. 
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tient's seeking compensation after a risk has occurred .85 This dis­
cussion will focus on the second group of activities-those that re­
duce the odds that an injured patient will sue the provider for 
compensation. The methods that are described are applicable to 
both activities, but the second group best illustrates the signifi­
cance of the conditional factors. 
Medical care delivery is fraught with both negligent and non­
negligent risks. The success of a medical risk management strategy 
will be determined by its effectiveness in persuading injured pa­
tients to accept their injuries as an unavoidable complication of 
their medical care. It is important to differentiate this acceptance 
of risk from the defense of assumption of risk. 
The classic statement of the assumption of risk defense is in 
Prosser's Law of Torts: 
In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means 
that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his consent to relieve the 
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his 
chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defen­
dant is to do or leave undone ... 
The defense of assumption of risk is in fact quite narrowly 
confined and restricted by two requirements: first, that the plain­
tiff must know and understand the risk that he is incurring, and 
second, that his choice to incur it must be entirely free and 
voluntary. 87 
The limits of this defense are sufficiently great that is is seldom 
possible to persuade a jury that a medical malpractice plaintiff 
should not win a recovery because the plaintiff assumed the risk of 
65. For an overview of medical risk management, see LAMBERT, MoDERN MEDICAL.
MIS­
TAKES (1978); Benesch, Risk Management in Pennsylvania Hospitals: Panacea or Poison?, 47 INs. CouNs. J. (1980); Bryant & Korsak, Who is the Risk Manager and What Does He Do?, 52 Hosp., Jan. 16, 1978, at 42; Groves & Korsak, Draft Job Description Provides Model 
for Risk Manager Position, 52 HOSP., June 16, 1978, at 70; Hirsch, Risk Management- The Physician's Role, 7 LEGAL AsPBcrs or Mao. Puc. 49 (1979); Korsak, Risk Management Activities Boost Effectiveness of Self-/Murance Program, 52 Hosp., Feb. 16, 1978, at 5�; �ucera & Ator, Risk Management, 32 J. HoSP. MGMT., Oct. 1978, at 26; Schwegel, Physi­cians Join in Efforts to Reduce Risks 8 HosP. MED. STAFF, Nov. 1979, at 2; Stearns & Fox, Assessing Quality Assurance and Risk Management Activities: A Profile Analysis, 5 QUALI­TY REv. BULL., Oct. 1979, at 26; Stewart, Risk Management: No Task for the Timid, 34 Tausn1:, Apr. 1979, at 10. 
66. W. Paossu, supra note 20, at «O. 
67. Id. at 447. 
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The most important limitation of the assumption of risk de­
fense in the medical environment is that it has not been accepted 
as a defense to negligent injuries. The courts systematically refuse 
to accept "blanket consent" forms that could conceivably cover 
any act of negligence, and no health care provider has used a con­
sent form that specifically includes a litany of negligent risks. 
While there is no theoretical reason why a patient could not con­
sent to (and thus assume) the risk of the surgeon's leaving a clamp 
inside the patient, the authors believe that a court, if faced with 
this situation, would rule that this type of consent would be 
against public policy.89 
Prosser's formulation for assumption of risk requires both 
prior knowledge and prior consent. 70 Acceptance of risk does not 
depend on this type of explicit agreement, but arises from the en­
tire context of the health care provider/patient relationship, both 
before and after injury. While this unstructured relationship pro­
vides a greater opportunity for mitigation of the damages, it also 
increases the chance that a pipeline may be created by a major 
shift in the public perception of the provider's competence. A med­
ical risk manager therefore must identify and monitor those fac�ors 
that condition the patient's acceptance of the risks of medical 
treatment.71 There are three main sources of information on those 
factors: the first is a retrospective evaluation of the treatment his­
tory72 of patients that have sued the facility in the past; the second 
is an analysis of reported malpractice cases and plaintiff's law liter­
ature to determine which factors condition the patient's attorney's 
decision to file a lawsuit;73 and the third is a patient-attitude sur-
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 444. 
70. Id. at 447 . 
. �1 .  For a discussion of the use o f  artificial intelligence techniques to analyz
e roe��; 
decisions, see Duda & Gasching, Knowledge Based Expert Systems Come of Age, 6 B 
238 (Sept. 1981) . 
. 
72· This information would be obtained by reviewing the medical records of 
all th� 
patients that sued the hospital in the past. It must be emphasized that this will 
onl� P;�t 
duce anecdotal data, unless a carefully matched control population of patients that 
did 
sue the hospital is also studied. . 
73· The
. 
importance of this type of review is illustrated by the tremendous �tte
n=� 
addressed to mfor�� consent in the hospital literature, while at the same time � �nfo
r 
W· survey shows that �t is a�ready being discounted as a cause o f  action by the plam�11f'
s 
ale? For �n �x�ellent d1scuss1on of this problem, see Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy 
Ti 
Law s Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. Rsv. 137, 170 (1977). 
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vey to determine what factors the patients of the facility consider 
important. 7' 
Once the risk manager has used these sources to develop a list 
of the relevant conditioning factors, a monitoring system must be 
developed to track those factors. 711 This monitoring system must 
meet three criteria: (1) It must flag outlier events rather than ob­
scure them. This means that all unusual events must be promptly 
brought to the attention of someone with the authority to inter­
vene if it is necessary. A prompt intervention can both mitigate the 
damages (persuading a patient not to leave the hospital, for exam­
ple) and reduce the chance of being sued by improving patient sat­
isfaction. (2) It must produce meaningful trend analyses rather 
than frequency reports. These analyses must not only provide in­
formation about the number of incidents, but must also provide 
information on whether there is a deviation from the expected 
number or type of incidents. For example, a ten-percent increase 
in deaths is not as useful as a report showing that the increase 
occurred on one day on one Boor. (3) It mtist not create new risks 
that increase the facility's liability. The most common type of new 
risk is the documentation of incompetent staff members without 
disciplining them. Meeting these criteria requires the design of a 
reporting system to collect the necessary data. This reporting sys­
tem will draw on traditional sources of risk management data such 
as incident reports, but it also must draw upon other data sources 
such as nursing committee reports, tissue committee reports, and 
the reports of any other. oversight committees the facility has in 
place.7• 
The compilation of this multisource data demands that stan­
dard forms he developed to faciliate the transfer of information 
from the committees to a central data base. This data base can be 
as simple as a set of cross-referenced index cards, but in all but the 
smallest facilities it will require the use of a computer to file elec-
74. Thia is actually classic market research, with health care aa the product. The main problem with this type of research is that the patients are often afraid to criticize the health care provider, making the Hpertise of the survey team especially important. See Ware, Ef­fects of Acquiescent Response Set on Patient Satisfaction Ratings; 16 Mao. CARE 327 0978). 
7�. For a discussion of the potential legal risks in computerizing .medical . data, see Brannigan & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective Medical Com­puter Programa, 7 AM. J. LAW & MBD., Summer 1981, at 123. 76. Jourr COMMISSION ON AccRBDlTATJON or HosPITALS, AccRBDITATION MANUAL FoR HOSPITALS (1982). 
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tronically the data and perform the necessary analyses.77 The de­
velopment of an effective computer data base management system 
requires careful attention to the potential legal consequences of 
uncontrolled access to the data. Once data is put in a machine­
retrievable form,7s it is as readily available to potential litigants as 
it is to the facility's risk manager. This can be especially harmful if 
the data demonstrates the presence of prevented or normally pre­
vented risks that the risk manager is unable to manage success­
fully. While this does not mean that secrecy is always the best pol­
icy (it is usually the worst policy when a patient requests his or her 
own records79), it is important that the risk manager be able to 
control the extent and timing of access to the general data base. 
This control requires both physical and legal safeguards. 
The physical protection of data is straightforward. The com­
puter should be of a limited-access type, preferably a dedicated 
machine, and there should be no other users on the system when 
the risk data base is on the system. If the facility does not have a 
dedicated computer for risk management, then it should make pro­
visions for storing the risk management data outside of the com­
puter when the data is not in use. The implementation of legal 
safeguards is not so straightforward. 
The recent decision in Upjohn Co. u. United States" set forth 
general guidelines for establishing the attorney work-product priv�­
lege against court ordered discovery. While the details of the deci­
sion are beyond the scope of this article,81 three important points 
must be considered when designing a risk management data base: 
( 1) both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product rule 
77 · For a discussion of the mathematical techniques that could be used to process this 
data, see E. CARMINE & R. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT (1979); F. HART· 
WIG & B. DEARING, EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS (1979)· HENKEL TESTS OP SIGNIFICANCE 
• 
• 
• RB-(1976); M. LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION (1980); $. NAGEL & M. NEEP, OPERATION S . C. SEARCH METHODS: As APPLIED TO POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE LEGAL PROCBSB (197S), 
OSTROM, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS: REGRESSION TECHNIQUES ( 1978). 
78. For a discussion of the organization of complex data bases, see Neely & Steward. 
Fundamentals of Relational Data Organization, BYTE, Nov. 1981 at 48. p 79. E. RICHARDS & K. RATHBUN, PATIENT'S RIGHTS HANDBOOK 6 (1980); Richards, a· 
tient 's Rights Issues in· Medical Risk Management MATERIALS POR THE F1RST ANNU� 
TEXAS HEALTH LAW INSTITUTE (1981); Richards & Rathbun The Law of Patient's Rights m 
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are not absolute protections, but may be defeated in certain cir­
cumstances;82 (2) information that is collected in anticipation of 
litigation may be protected, even if it is not collected under the 
direct supervision of an attorney;88 and (3) previously unprotected 
information may not be sheltered by giving it to an attorney.84 A 
facility that is  planning a risk management program must decide 
to what extent it needs to protect its data from discovery before it 
begins data collection. If it decides that it needs the maximum pro­
tection from discovery that is available, then it must incorporate 
an attorney into the risk management scheme. This can be an 
outside counsel who supervises the data collection and also per­
forms the necessary computer analysis of the raw data, or it may 
be an in-house counsel, if the in-house counsel is truly an indepen­
dent counsel. If it can be shown that this in-house counsel actually 
acts in an administrative capacity, then the work-product doctrine 
may not be applicable. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The rapidly escalating cost of litigation has made it imperative 
that corporations develop alternatives to the traditional legal 
mechanisms for dispute resolution. Risk management programs are 
an effective means of avoiding disputes and can be very cost effec­
tive if properly designed. While it is simple to design a program 
that will deal with obvious, costly risks, the optimal development 
of a program to deal with risks whose cost of occurrence nearly 
equals their cost of management requires sophisticated analysis 
techniques. The application of these techniques demands that a 
uniform method of data handling be developed and that the sys­
tematic identification and monitoring of conditional factors be car­
ried out. The authors have tried to present an analytical frame­
�ork to allow risk managers in diverse environments to share 
�nformation and contribute to a general model of risk management 
Interventions. 
82. Id. at 1145. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
